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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
ground of the case and the principles involved were discussed in some
detail in last year's Survey.7 The fallacy inherent in the majority opinion
is the assumption that there are only two possible positions for the court
to take. One is that mandatory cumulative voting must be given maxi-
mum effect in guarantying minority representation and thus any form of
classification is prohibited by the provision for mandatory voting.8 The
other position is that the mandatory provision does not insure minority
representation, but merely establishes it in the absence of a classified
board. The Supreme Court adopted the latter position and upheld the
action of the corporation. It is submitted that there is a third position
which the law can and should take, i.e., that both statutes should be given
effect, and corporations should be permitted to classify the board, thus
reducing the minority's right of representation, as long as the right of the
minority is not completely abolished as it was in this case. This third
position was the one adopted by the court of appeals, by the able dissent
of Chief Justice Weygand, and by the new Corporation Code.9
Another interesting case on voting control is Whtmg v. Bryant.10
The case is discussed in some detail elsewhere in this Survey."1 It
is important because of the dictum to the effect that a shareholder owes
a duty to the corporation and to the other shareholders to vote his shares
for the best interests of the group as a whole, and not for selfish motives.
This language indicates the broadening scope of the fiduciary duty owed
to a minority shareholder by a majority shareholder.12 The case is also a
perfect illustration of the adaptability of the trust device as an instrument
of corporate control tailored to fit a specific corporation.
HUGH ALAN Ross
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Jurisdiction
It is interesting that the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace to try
a misdemeanor case should be challenged successfully in the year im-
mediately preceding the effective date of the justice of the peace salary
71955 Survey, 7 WEsT. REs. L. REv. 263 (1956)
8 This is the postion adopted by the Supreme Court of Illinois in Wolfson v. Avery,
6 Il., 2d 78, 126 N.E.2d 701 (1955).
'The new code provides that boards can be classified, but no class may contain less
than three persons. OHIO REV. CODE § 1701.57
1 131 N.E.2d 425 (Ohio App. 1956).
U See TRusTs section, mfra.
See Note, Fiductary Duty of Controlling Shareholders, 7 WEsT. REs. L. REv. 467
(1956).
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law. Until January 1, 1956, justices of the peace received the costs
assessed in cases before them as their compensation. In the principal
case the accused was charged with assault and battery and taken before a
justice of the peace. He signed a written waiver of jury trial, and there-
upon without hearing further evidence the justice found hun guilty, fined
hun $100 and costs of $27.42, and committed him to jail for nonpay-
ment. A writ of habeas corpus was -then issued to free the accused
from unlawful detention, and the probate court ordered his release.' It
held on authority of the Tumey case& that the justice of the peace was
disqualified from proceeding with the case because of his pecuniary in-
terest. This disqualification was not removed by the waiver of jury
trial. Another substantial ground for ordering the discharge was apparent
on the record: the finding of guilty upon the complaint alone, without
the hearing of any evidence, was considered a denial of due process of law.
Section 2945.05 of the Ohio Revised Code provides a procedure for
a waiver of trial by jury in common pleas court. Ohio Revised Code
section 2945.06 authorizes the court to proceed with trial without a jury
when the defendant has waived his right to a jury trial. In the principal
case the defendant, his counsel and the prosecutor orally stated to the
court that it was agreed that the case should be heard without a jury
and that a jury was waived. The court of appeals, on its own motion,
there being no assignment of error, determined that the Revised Code
provision requiring wrztten waiver of trial by jury was a mandatory re-
quirement for jurisdiction to try the case without a jury, and -held that the
trial court had no jurisdiction on the basis of the record The judgment
was reversed and the cause remanded.
In another case, the petitioner brought an original action in habeas
corpus in the court of appeals to challenge the validity of his arrest and
detention upon a forgery indictment, which had been reinstated after the
court had vacated a nolle proseqau; entered at the previous term.4  The
petitioner was discharged from custody. After the term the trial court
may not set aside its order of nolle prosequs and reinstate the indictment.
The court pointed out, however, that such a ruling did not in any way
prejudice the prosecution in proceeding against the offender in a proper
case at a subsequent term under a new indictment.
'In re Tullius, 137 N.E.2d 312 (Ohio Prob. 1955).
'Tumey v. State, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
*State v. Fife, 100 Ohio App. 550, 137 N.E.2d 429 (1954). Lack of jurisdiction
because of non-written waiver was also one of the bases for the decision in State v.
Ferguson, 100 Ohio App. 191, 135 N.E.2d 884 (1955).
'In e Golib, 99 Ohio App. 88, 130 N.E.2d 855 (1955)
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Construction of Statutes Defining Crime
An interesting court of appeals decision5 reversed a conviction of first
degree murder under Ohio Revised Code section 2901.01 because of the
lack of any evidence to show premeditated malice. There was evidence
that the killing was without reason, justification or excuse, but the accused
had never seen the victim before the killing occurred in a scuffle over a
gun which the accused had been holding in his hand. This did not con-
stitue evidence that there was deliberate and premeditated malice in the
accused's mind at the time of the homicide. Nor could the verdict be
supported in this case by application of the principle of law that one
who intends with deliberate and premeditated malice to kill another
person, 'but instead kills a third person against whom he has no malice,
may be found guilty of murder in the first degree. There was no overt
act against an intended victim.
Section 2901.11 of the Oho Revised Code makes it a criminal offense
to escape from "any confinement" or restraint imposed as a result of a
criminal proceeding. The accused had been charged with assault and
battery and carrying concealed weapons. He had 'been convicted of
assault and trespass by a village mayor without having waived a jury
trial and had been sentenced under this conviction. In addition, he had
'been held in jail, in default of bond, on the concealed weapons charge
for a total of eight months without ever having had or waived a pre-
liminary hearing. He took matters into his own hands and escaped from
the county jail. He was indicted for escaping. At his trial, the com-
mon pleas court entered a directed verdict for defendant on the ground
that the confinement from which he escaped was illegal, and released him
from custody.
The prosecuting attorney then filed a bill of exceptions m the court
of appeals in accordance with the Revised Code.6 The court of appeals
allowed the bill to be filed and rendered a decision which has the effect
of determining the law to govern in a similar case.7 The court of appeals
5State v. Cosby, 100 Ohio App. 459, 137 N.E.2d 282 (1955) Since the jury had
adopted the prosecution's theory that defendant knew what he was doing and did
intend to kill the victim, with ample evidence to support this finding, the court of
appeals modified the judgment and remanded the cause to the trial court with in-
structions that a judgment be entered finding the defendant guilty of second degree
murder with sentence accordingly.
OrIo REv. CoDE §§ 2945.67 and 2945.68 authorize the presentation of a bill of
exceptions by a prosecuting attorney to the trial judge and its presentation in a
criminal action to the court of appeals or Supreme Court, upon leave obtained, for
the decision of the court upon the points presented.
OO REv. CoDE § 2945.70 authorizes the appellate court to allow the bill to be
presented and to decide the matters presented. The decision does not affect the
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confirmed the opinion of the lower court that the confinement was illegal
under the circumstances, and that the "escape" statute could -be applied
only to an escape from "any legal confinement."
Section 4511.31 of the Ohio Revised Code requires operators of motor
vehicles to obey the directions of the Department of Highways in driving
and passing other vehicles on any state highway. This requires obedience
to the directions of the markings on the roadway. The department's traf-
fic control manual declares that crossing a yellow line to overtake and
pass is both illegal and extremely hazardous. The manual does not cover
the situation in which a driver enters the left side of a two lane highway
to pass another vehicle, and is forced to continue on the left side beyond
the point where a yellow line begins on the right side of the center line.
A driver who found himself in that situation and was forced to cross the
yellow line in order to get back into his right hand lane, was convicted in
a municipal court of violating this code section. The court of appeals, in
affirming a reversal by the court of common pleas, held that the driver
did not violate the code in continuing in the left lane until he could
safely cross back into the right lane, when he started his passing before
reaching the point where a yellow line began on the right side of the
center line.0
Section 1433.45 of the Ohio Revised Code prohibits the use of "nets"
in certain waters of the Lake Erie fishing district. The owners of land
abutting -upon Sandusky Bay had for some time engaged in commercial
fishing by the use of seines along the beaches fronting on their property.
This practice was allegedly carried on with the knowledge of the Division
of Wildlife in the belief that the statute did not apply to seines. Eventually
administrative officers, however, threatened enforcement against the use
of seines, and the petitioners brought a declaratory judgment action to
obtain a favorable construction of the statute. The court of appeals
affirmed a judgment of the common pleas court sustaining petitioner's
position.10 The opinion utilized several rules of statutory interpretation.
It pointed out that the question is not what the General Assembly in-
tended to enact, but the meaning of what it did enact. The phrase "any
net whatever" was the crucial provision in the statute. While the dictionary
definition would include the term "seine" within the category of nets, the
court looked at the business of fishing to ascertain the industry under-
judgment on the merits. The decision, however, does determine the law to govern
in future similar cases.
'State v. Ferguson, 100 Ohio App. 191, 135 N.E.2d 884 (1955).
oState v. Shackleford, 100 Ohio App. 487, 137 N.B.2d 637 (1955) The court
adhered to the well-settled rule that a strict construction is to be given to penal
statutes.
"'Wadsworth v. Dambach, 99 Ohio App. 269, 133 N.E.2d 158 (1954).
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standing of the two terms and found that they were distinguished and
that a seine was not included within the term "net." Furthermore, for
nearly 40 years the administrative officers within the area had not taken
any steps to enforce the statute against the use of seines. This fact,
together with the failure of the legislature to make any changes in the
law after awareness of -the administrative attitude, were considered good
evidence of a legislative intent excluding seines. All of these factors
combined were considered sufficient evidence to sustain a declaratory
judgment on behalf of the plaintiffs, although injunctive relief was held
inproper because of the full and complete relief afforded by the grant-
ing of the declaratory judgment.
In another case the court had to consider the application of Ohio
Revised Code section 4399.16, which specifically names as "tavern keeper"
a person who was the manager of an establishment. The court held
that the phrase as used in the code is a technical term and does not apply
to a mere employee, even though he may exercise managerial authority;
it means the owner."
In one case the court of appeals was called upon to determine whether
a sale of an undivided fractional interest in real estate, which was to be
evidenced eventually by the issuance of shares of stock, was a sale of
securities coming within the Ohio Securities Act and a sufficient basis
for prosecuting the defendant for selling securities without being licensed
to sell securities under the Blue Sky Law of Ohio.'2 The court concluded
that the purchaser did not buy securities but the right to occupy suites in
an apartment building, with the further right to have an undivided per-
centage interest in the property transferred by warranty deed. It held that
the transaction came within the statutory exclusion of sales of real estate
from the Ohio Securities Act.'"
Two court of appeals decisions were concerned with multiple crimes
growing out of the same transaction. In the first case the defendant
threw lye water into the face of the prosecuting witness. He was prose-
cuted under an indictment charging him in the first count with maming
by unlawfully putting out the prosecuting witness' eye, and in a second
count with purposeful disfigurement with the use of lye. A conviction
on both counts was sustained.' 4 Answering the defendant's argument that
there was 'but one act involved, the court pointed out that the result was
' State v. Gullion, 132 N.E.2d 902 (Ohio C.P. 1955) This was an appeal from
a judgment of conviction in the Municipal Court of Columbus for permitting rioting
or drunkenness on the premises. Judgment was reversed and the case dismissed.
State v. Hirsch, 131 N.E.2d 419 (Ohio App. 1956)
HIOO REv. CODE § 1707.03.
"
4State v. Benjamin, 132 N.E.2d 761 (Ohio App. 1956)
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both a maiming and a disfiguring, two separate offenses under the Ohio
Revised Code.1 5
In the other case, from Franklin County, the accused was seeking
release from the Ohio penitentiary on a writ of habeas corpus on the
ground that convictions for breaking and entering in the night season
and larceny could not be sustained where factually there was but one
transaction. The writ was denied, since the court did not agree that
there was but one transaction.16 Breaking into a building in the night
season with intent to steal was one transaction; the next step, which con-
stituted the actual stealing from that building of property of a value suf-
ficient to constitute grand larceny, was a different transacton.1 7
Two court of appeals decisions involved the power of municipal legis-
lative authority to define crime. In the first case, the court held that a
city has the authority to enact an ordinance which defines the offense of
damaging property without requiring that the acts constituting the offense
be done with intent.18
The other case involved an action to enjoin the enforcement of a city
ordinance making it unlawful for any person to have a "pinball" game or
machine in his possession, custody or control. A permanent injunction
against the enforcement of the ordinance was granted.' 9 Since 'the ordi-
nance as drawn would preclude the possession of a pinball machine in a
private home, solely for the amusement of the owner, it was considered
absolutely prohibitory in nature and beyond the authority of the council
to enact under the police power granted to municipalities by Article
XVIII, section 3 of -the Ohio Constitution.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Arrest
The combined effect of two sections of the Ohio Revised Code" is
to render persons immune from arrest on Sunday except when charged
OHIo Ray. CODE § 2901.19. The first paragraph of this section specifically de-
fines maiming, and the third paragraph sets out the elements of the separate offense
of disfigurement.
i'Wyatt v. Alvis, 136 N.E.2d 726 (Ohio App. 1955).
'Burglary is defined by Omio REv. CODE § 2907.10; grand larceny, by OHIo REV.
CODE § 2907.20.
'City of Bexley v. Ivey, 136 N.E.2d 624 (Ohio App. 1955). The court of appeals
affirmed the judgment of the court of common pleas, which in turn had affirmed a
judgment of conviction entered in the mayor's court, on questions of law. It adopted
the opinion of the common pleas court, reported in 136 NE.2d 622 (Ohio C.P.
1953).
'Benjamin v. Columbus, 136 N.E.2d 641 (Ohio C.P. 1956).
2"OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2331.12 and 2331.13.
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with treason, felony, or breach of the peace. An interesting application
of these code provisions appears in State v. McCoy.2 A state highway
patrolman made an attempt on Sunday to serve a warrant charging a man
with operating an automobile with fictitious license plates. The patrol-
man pursued the violator into defendant's store where the defendant
attempted to -block -the officer's entrance and prevent the arrest. The
patrolman thereupon arrested the defendant, charging him with unlaw-
fully interfering with and obstructing an officer in discharge of his official
duties.22  The defendant was brought to trial in common pleas court
and his motion for a directed verdict was sustained. The prosecutor
appealed on questions of law, and the court of appeals affirmed the judg-
ment. The operation of a motor vehicle under the conditions charged
in the warrant of arrest was not a breach of the peace, and any arrest
under it on Sunday would have been unlawful. Defendant, therefore, did
not violate the code in attempting to prevent an unlawful act.2 3  Since
defendant's arrest was without a warrant, the holding of the court ap-
plies to any arrest, whether with or without a warrant, for alleged offenses
not falling within the exceptions mentioned in the code: treason, felony
or breach of the peace.
In another case an accused collaterally attacked a warrant issued for
his arrest by the deputy clerk of a municipal court upon the theory that
the issuance of a warrant is such an act of discretion that it cannot be
delegated by the clerk of court to his deputy. The court of appeals held
that the issuance of a warrant is a ministerial act and therefore is within
the competence of a deputy clerk. A writ of habeas corpus was therefore
denied.2 4  Any objections of this kind must be raised by a direct attack
on the judgment.
In a third case the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of con-
viction of operating an automobile while under the influence of intoxicat-
ing liquor where the accused pleaded to the affidavit without raising any
question of the legality of his arrest without an affidavit.25 His arrest
had occurred at a time when he was not operating a motor vehicle and
was not at the scene of the accident, and a timely objection by motion to
"199 Ohio App. 161, 131 N.E.2d 679 (1955).
2OHio REv. CODE § 2917.33.
23OHIO REV. CODE § 2331.14 provides that a person unlawfully arrested in viola-
tion of sections 2331.11 through 2331.13 shall be discharged by a writ of habeas
corpus or in a summary way by motion in the court from which the warrant was
obtained, at the cost of the official who sued out the process.
2" State ex 'el Focke v. Price, 137 N.E.2d 163 (Ohio App. 1955), aff'd per curfam,
165 Ohio St. 340, 135 N.E.2d 407 (1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 892 (1956).
' State v. Williams, 98 Ohio App. 513, 130 N.E.2d 395 (1954)
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quash at the time of the accused's plea to the affidavit would have raised
the legality of his arrest-2
Preliminary Examination
Under Revised Code section 2937.02, a court or magistrate may post-
pone a preliminary hearing for a period not to exceed ten days, upon
petition of either party. Any postponement beyond ten days, without
consent of both parties, is forbidden. In one case,27 a person charged
with carrying concealed weapons was held in county jail for eight months
without being accorded a preliminary examination. The court of ap-
peals held that confinement under such circumstances was illegal and void.
Extradition
A person who desired to avoid extradition to another state to answer
a charge of child desertion, filed a petition in common pleas court to
have an order for support entered against him under the Uniform Sup-
port of Dependents Act 2 s Though there was no objection to his plead-
ing, the court raised the question of jurisdiction on its own motion. It
ordered the petition dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.-
The court stated .that it is contrary to the policy of the support and
extradition statutes to permit an absconding obligor to secure a support
order in another state, based entirely on his own evidence, comply with
the order and thereby avoid extradition for criminal nonsupport or child
desertion.
=Ibid. Despite the fact that the court of appeals ruled that pleading to the affidavit
waived any objection to the arrest, paragraph one of the syllabi reads as follows:
"A police officer is authorized to arrest without a warrant a person found in a
state of intoxication and who admits to driving a car which was involved in a colli-
sion; and such person may be held for a reasonable time until a warrant for ius
arrest can be secured."
This holding does not appear to be supported by Omio REv. CODE § 2935.03,
relative to arrest without a warrant generally, but might properly be based upon
OHio REV. CoDE § 3773.22, namely, being found in a state of intoxication, without
regard to the operation of a motor vehicle.
'State v. Ferguson, 100 Ohio App. 191, 135 N.E.2d 884 (1955). An escape by
one who had been detained in this manner did not violate OHio REv. CODE § 2901.-
11 since that crime is based upon a "legal confinement." See discussion of the
escape problem raised by this case, supra note 8.
SOHIO REv. CODE § 3115.01 et seq.
' Sands v. Sands, 136 N.E.2d 747 (Ohio C.P. 1956). The opinion indicates that
no civil support action had been instituted in the other state. Thus the petitioner's
claim was simply that he was entitled to bring the action and have an order for sup-
port entered against him, and abiding thereby, be exempt from future extradition on
the criminal charge.
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The Uniform Criminal Extradition Act ° contemplates that a person
arrested under the governor's warrant of extradition may have a writ of
habeas corpus to test the legality of his arrest. There is no provision in
the act for admission to bail in a proceeding under the act after arrest on
the governor's warrant. A common pleas court heard the petitioner's com-
plaint in the habeas corpus proceeding, denied release, and denied ad-
mission to bail also, pending appeal. The accused -then applied to the
court of appeals -for admission to bail, pending his hearing on an appeal
from the denial of the writ. The court of appeals admitted petitioner to
bail.3' It explained that the writ of habeas corpus is a collateral remedy,
and independent legal proceeding apart from the extradition proceeding,
and civil in nature.
The court of appeals had ample authority to stay the judgment of the
common pleas court denying the release and to release the accused from
custody upon whatever terms it deemed appropriate under the circum-
stances.
The Grand Jury
A witness was summoned to appear before the Grand Jury of Sum-
mit County. The witness instead sent his attorney who presented a let-
ter stating that the witness would not appear because the jury was not
legally constituted. A written motion for contempt was filed and heard
after due notice. The trial court found the witness guilty of contempt
and entered a judgment which, in effect, committed him to jail until
such time as he was willing to give testimony; thereupon a term of ten
days imprisonment and a fine of $500 would become effective, without
credit for prior incarceration. An appeal was taken by the witness, raising
the issue of the legality of the grand jury and claiming double jeopardy
arising from the two sentences for contempt. The judgment was af-
firmed.3 2  First, the court held that -the grand jury was a legally-consti-
tuted 'body; second, that a summoned witness cannot challenge the au-
thority of a court or of the grand jury, provided either has existence
de 1ure or de facto; third, that there is no double jeopardy because the
judgment in question combined a civil remedy and a criminal penalty in
fixing -the conditions of imprisonment.33
'*OHIO REV. CODE § 2963.01-.29. Section 2963.09 also makes it a misdemeanor
for any person to deliver wilfully any person arrested upon the governor s warrant
to an agent of the demanding state before the hearing requested by the accused has
been held.
3 Ruther v. Sweeney, 137 N.E.2d 292 (Ohio App. 1956).
'State v. Mirman, 99 Ohio App. 382, 133 N.E.2d 796 (1955)
' The order imprisoning the witness until his indicated willingness to give tesumony
was predicated on OHIO REv. CODE § 2705.06, a statement of the coercive powers
[June
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Affidavits and Indictments
The Ohio Revised Code34 seeks -to prevent inaccuracies or imperfec-
tions in an indictment, information or warrant from having any adverse
effect on the prosecution, provided the charge is sufficient to inform the
accused fairly and reasonably of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. One case in the court of appeals applied this "saving" pro-
vision to sustain a conviction. The affidavit charging the offense was
irregular because not sworn to by one of two signing officers, but it was
sworn to by the other and provided adequate information of the offense
charged. The false signature of the one officer was treated as surplusage,
and the irregularity in the affidavit was not prejudicial to the accused.3 5
Another statute36 provides that an indictment shall not be held invalid
because of surplusage or repugnant allegations when there is sufficient
matter alleged to indicate the crime and person charged. An indictment
for procuring a miscarriage concluded with words not included in or
required by the statute defining the crime. The trial judge instructed the
jury to disregard the surplus allegations and left them in the indictment.
The indictment, however, fully informed the accused of the charge, and
the court held that the surplus allegations, under the circumstances, were
not left in the indictment prejudicially.3 7
Jurors and Jury Trial
An 'interesting question involving the general qualifications for jury
service arose in the course of a motion to reconsider filed before a court
of appeals. An affidavit alleged that one of the jurors at the trial was
not a registered voter at the time she was impaneled as a juror in the
case. The juror, however, had all of the qualifications of an elector as set
out in Article V, section 1 of the Ohio Constitution, including residence
for one year in the state, county and ward. The court distinguished be-
tween an elector and a voter, and held that a person who meets all of the
qualifications of an "elector" as defined in the constitution, is a qualified
of a court, without which witnesses could obstruct the administration of justice and
impede the operation of the entire judicial system.
The order imprisoning and fining the witness upon finding hlm guilty of con-
tempt was based on OHio REv. CoDE § 2705.05, a definition of a specific penalty
which, in the discretion of the court, may be imposed in the public interest to vindi-
cate the authority of the court and deter similar conduct.
"' Oio Rnv. CODE § 2945.83 (A).
'Toledo v. Miscikowski, 99 Ohuo App. 189, 132 N.E.2d 231 (1955).
=Osuo REv. CODE § 2941.08 (I).
State v. Roche, 135 N.E.2d 789 (Ohio App. 1955). The surplus allegation was:
"and was prematurely delivered of said child."
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juror, even though the person might not be registered as a voter for cur-
rent elections, having thereby elected not to vote.38
Under section 1905.11 of the Ohio Revised Code, the mayor of a
village has jurisdiction to try misdemeanors in which there is a consti-
tutional right to jury trial. In this type of case there must be a waiver of
jury trial in writing signed by the accused and filed before the com-
mencement of the trial.39 A village mayor tried, convicted and sentenced
an accused of the offenses of assault and trespass, without the accused hav-
ing waived a jury trial in writing, but without his having demanded a
jury trial. The mayor sentenced him to pay a fine and serve a jail sen-
tence for both offenses. During the time he was serving the jail sen-
tences, he escaped, and was subsequently charged with and tried for escape.
This -brought into issue the legality of his detention under the foregoing
sentences, among other things.40 Since imprisonment could be imposed
upon conviction of both offenses, the accused had a constitutional right
to jury trial. His failure to demand a jury trial did not constitute a waiver
since the record must actually show an affirmative waiver. The accused
refused to waive a jury trial. In such cases of constitutional right to jury
trial, the mayor is without jurisdiction to try the cause without a jury
where the defendant does not waive trial by jury.
Right to Defend With Counsel
The Ohio Constitution, Artide I, section 10, contains a guaranty
of the right of an accused to appear and defend in person and with
counsel. The criminal code4 ' implements this right by requiring the court
to determine whether the accused has counsel and if he is without
counsel or unable to employ counsel, to assign counsel to defend him.
In re Motz42 presents an interesting application of this right. The accused
had -been indicted on seventeen counts. She had been unable to procure
counsel until the eve of her trial. She appeared in court the next day with
her "new" attorney who made a motion for a continuance. This motion
was denied, and the attorney permitted to withdraw from the case. The
trial then proceeded for seven days without counsel representing the
SS mbd.
For similar provisions applicable to mayor's courts, see OHIO REV. CODE § 1905.03.
"State v. Ferguson, 100 Ohio App. 191, 135 N.E.2d 884 (1955) For a discussion
of the crime of escape in this case see, 8 WEsr. RES. L. REv. 220 (1957)
"OHIO REv. CODE § 2941.50.
"In re Motz, 100 Ohio App. 296, 136 N.E.2d 430 (1955) The order of discharge
called for her removal from the Ohio Reformatory for Women and for delivery to
the custody of the Franklin County Sheriff, to be returned to the trial court for
further proceedings.
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accused, and without the accused ever having -been advised of her right
to counsel or requesting the court to appoint counsel. She was convicted,
and for more than four months thereafter she was unable to consult
counsel. In the meantime the appeal period had expired. She obtained
a writ of habeas corpus at her first opportunity. The court of appeals
held that the failure to advise her of her right to have the court appoint
counsel to defend her was a denial of a fundamental right, and therefore
the conviction and judgment were void and the subsequent imprisonment
illegal. The release from custody was not absolute, since the indictment
was still in force and the common pleas court still had jurisdiction.
Trial Proceedings
1. Generi
The celebrated Sheppard case was finally terminated during the cal-
endar year 1956. The trial of this case lasted for more than nine weeks,
and the jury deliberated from December 17 to December 21, 1954 in
reaching a verdict of guilty. The record consisted of 7,308 pages, and
the defendant asserted 37 errors in his appeal to the court of appeals.
That court overruled these assignments of error and affirmed the judg-
ment of conviction of second degree murder.43 The opinion of the court
of appeals covers 53 pages in the official reports, devoting eight pages to
the assignments of error. The defendant then appealed to the Supreme
Court, assigning 29 errors by the court of appeals, and devoting 1,097
pages of briefs to their discussion. In the Supreme Court the 29 errors
were combined into seven questions of law, and in oral argument only
three of these were especially stressed. The Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment of the court of appeals, holding that there was no error preju-
dicial to the defendant in the record.44 The majority opinion directed its
State v. Sheppard, 100 Ohio App. 345, 128 NXE.2d 471 (1955).
There was a separate appeal from the action of the trial court in overruling a
motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. This is reported
as State v. Sheppard, 100 Ohio App. 399, 128 N.E.2d 504 (1955), appeal dismissed
for lack of a debatable constitutional question, 164 Ohio St. 428, 131 N.E.2d 837(1956).
"State v. Sheppard, 165 Ohio St. 293, 135 N.E.2d 340 (1956), cert. dented, 352
U.S. 910 (1956). Mr. Justice Frankfurter filed a memorandum in wich he
sought to reiterate the significance of a denial of the discretionary writ of certiorari.
He took pains to point out that the denial of the petition in no way implies Supreme
Court approval of the decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio. The only significance
which could be attached to the denial is that "for one reason or another this case
did not commend itself to at least four members of the Court as falling within those
considerations which should lead this Count to exercise its discretion in reviewing a
lower court's decasion."
A pennon for rehearing was denied in December 1956. 77 Sup. Ct. 323 (1956).
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attention to answering the three questions of law stressed in the oral
argument:
1. Did the atmosphere under which the trial began require the trial
court to grant a change of venue?
2. Did the handling of the jury, by permitting members to telephone
their immediate families at night between sessions, require a
reversal of the judgment on the verdict?
3. Was there sufficient evidence to submit the case to -the jury and
was there sufficient substantial evidence to justify the verdict
rendered?
On the first question, the opinion reaffirms prior Ohio-rulings that
the exercise of the right to order a change of venue lies in the discretion
of the trial court. Further, it is not an abuse of discretion to refuse to
order a change of venue without prejudice until it can be determined
whether a fair and impartial jury can be impaneled. Finally, it is not an
abuse of discretion to deny a change of venue when a jury of 12 mem-
bers is impaneled and sworn before a venire of 75 is exhausted, only
14 having been dismissed because of a firm opinion, and the defendant
having exercised only five of his six peremptory challenges.
On the second question, the opinion relies upon the statutory rule45
that no judgment of conviction shall be reversed in any court for any
cause, unless it appears affirmatively from the record that the defendant
was prejudiced thereby or was prevented from having a fair trial. Since
there was no affirmative showing of prejudice, the question was answered
in the negative. The opinion states that the Court cannot presume as a
matter of law that there was prejudice from the fact that some members
of the jury made telephone calls during recesses in their deliberations to
members of their immediate families.
On the matter of substantial evidence, the majority of the court
examined the instructions of the trial judge, particularly those dealing
with convictions based on circumstantial evidence, which it found consis-
tent with the Ohio rule that the facts established must be entirely irrecon-
cilable with any daim or theory of innocence and admit of no other
hypothesis than the guilt of the accused. Given a qualified jury and
correct instructions, the opinion quotes with approval from a statement
of the late Mr. Justice Holmes, in presuming that the jury found facts
because they were proved: "But it must -be assumed that the constitutional
tribunal does its duty, and finds facts only because they were proved. '45a
'0OHo REV. CODE § 2945.83 (E)
"a Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 206 (1904), quoted with approval in State v.
Sheppard, 165 Ohio St. 293, 301, 135 N.E.2d 340, 346 (1956)
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Since the majority of the court could not find any prejudice to the de-
fendant in any of the other assignments of error, it affirmed the judg-
ment of the court of appeals.
A very strong dissenting opinion was written and concurred in by
one judge.46 Some of the major points in this opinion are very inter-
esting. First, it expressed dissatisfaction with the brief treatment of the
29 allegations of error, condensed to three questions of law presented in
derail in the oral argument and exclusively discussed by the majority
opinion. Second, it found much fault with the conclusion of the ma-
jority that from the facts found there could be no reasonable hypothesis
of innocence, pointing out that the state had established by its evidence
facts and circumstances which could not be reconciled with any reasonable
hypothesis except that of defendanes innocence. Third, it deplored the
majority's brief treatment of the disregard of the statutory rules relative
to communications with the jury from the outside, i.e., the telephone
communications with relatives where there was no evidence of content
except on the nonprejudicial conversations of the jurors overheard by the
bailiff. Fourth, it found numerous prejudicial errors in the instructions
and rulings of the trial court, particularly concerning the purposes for
which the jury might consider evidence of good character and reputation,
the use of the legend of George Washington and the cherry tree as a de-
vice for illustrating the application of circumstantial evidence, and the
admission of hearsay evidence which could have been given weight 'by the
jury on the issue of motive.
Finally, it contended that the court should not deny the accused the
opportunity to establish his innocence by summarily determining that the
errors at the trial were not prejudicial: "On the record before this court,
such a determination would represent in my opinion a mere and highly
doubtful guess." In answer to the point made by the majority opinion
that it must affirmatively appear from the record that the defendant was
prejudiced thereby or prevented from having a fair trial, the dissenting
opinion points out that the code is phrased differently on the matters of
the admission or rejection of evidence and the misdirection of the jury
where the phraseology used is that "the accused was or may have been
prejudiced thereby."47 (Emphasis added.) It concluded that it would
be impossible to reach any other conclusion -but that this defendant "may
" The Chief Justice disqualified himself from hearing the appeal, and Judge Ma-
tthias acted as Chief Justice, pursuant to OHio REv. CODE § 2503.04, and Judge
Montgomery of the Fifth Appellate District sat by designation in the place of Judge
Matthias. Judge Bell wrote the majority opinion, concurred in by all other members
of the court sitting except Judges Taft and Hart. Judge Taft wrote the dissenting
opinion, concurred in by Judge Hart.
'7 OHio REv. CODE § 2945.83 (C) (D).
19571
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
have been prejudiced" by the errors in the judge's charge and by the
admission of hearsay evidence.
2. Pleas
Two court of appeals decisions emphasize the fact that the plea of
guilty is not to be entered lightly and that once entered and acted upon
by the court, it is very difficult to secure a change of plea or a subsequent
'hearing on such a matter as insanity at the time of trial. In the absence
of a showing of a fraudulent inducement to enter a plea of guilty, a party
is not entitled as a matter of right to change to a plea of not guilty 8
Furthermore, a person who might have pleaded insanity at the time of
trial 'but who pleads -guilty and is sentenced on the plea, waives any
right to a hearing on the issue of insanity at the time of trial.49
The concluding paragraph of the opinion in the latter case contains
some puzzling language. After asserting that the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over the appellant, the court concludes that appellanes mental
condition at the time of trial was not such as to prevent him from having
a fair trial. Therefore none of his constitutional rights and privileges
were invadedY0
The statute with which the court is concerned does not deal with the
plea of "not guilty 'by reason of insanity." Its purpose is to provide ma-
chinery for determining whether the accused is insane at the time of trial'
The statute dealing with pleas to the indictment does provide that a
failure to plead "not guilty by reason of insanity" raises a conclusive
presumption of sanity.5 2  But there is no comparable language in the
statute considered in the principal case. On the contrary, it mentions
three sources from which a suggestion of insanity at the time of prosecu-
tion may come: suggestion of counsel accompanied by a certificate of a
reputable physician to that effect presented in court, suggestion of present
insanity by the grand jury, or "if it otherwise comes to the notice of the
court that such person is not then sane." Under this statute it becomes
the duty of the court upon receiving notice under any of these methods to
examine the question of sanity or insanity or, in the alternative, present
the issue to a jury for determination in accordance with its terms.
The succeeding code sectlon53 gives a suggestion of the legislative m-
'In re Spenskys Petition, 133 N.E.2d 195 (Ohio App. 1955).
" McCane, Jr. v. Alvis, 98 Ohio App. 506, 130 N.E.2d 372 (1954).
' This condusion relating to mental condition is inconsistent with the holding that
the filing of a plea of guilty waives any question of insanity at the time of trial.
6mOHio REv. CODE3 5 2945.37
6Omo REv. CODE § 2943.03 (E)
OHio REv. CODE § 2945.38. This section concludes with the following clause:
[June
SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1956
tent in providing for this procedure for determination of insamty at the
tume of prosecution: a person cannot in fairness be required to stand
trial for a crime until such tune as hIs "reason" is restored. Under the
facts surrounding this case, appellant was under guardianship at the time
of trial, had previously been adjudged mentally incompetent by the Army,
and had also been charged with an earlier offense and upon suggestion of
insanity had been committed to Lima State Hospital for a time. Were
not these facts sufficient "notice" to the trial court of appellants possible
lack of samty to require an inquiry into the issue?
3. Double Jeopardy
Two cases discussed the possibility of the same act giving rise to more
than one offense. It is well recognized that a single act may constitute
several offenses by virtue of different statutes or ordinances. Thus a con-
viction on one charge may not be a bar to a subsequent conviction and
sentence on the other charge, unless the evidence required to support the
conviction on one would be sufficient to warrant a conviction on the
other. An example of this is presented by a Supreme Court decision, which
held that a conviction of reckless driving in violation of a city ordinance
could not -be pleaded m bar of a charge of operating an automobile while
under the influence of intoxicating liquor prohibited by another ordi-
nance.54 Evidence which would be sufficient to sustain a conviction for
reckless driving would not be sufficient to sustain a conviction for operat-
ing or being in control of a vehicle while intoxicated.
On the other hand, the plea of double jeopardy is properly raised to
a second indictment for an act predicated upon the same transaction and
related to the same subject matter, according to one court of appeals.55
The state of the record in this case was such that full relief could not
be granted, but the court did agree with the contention of the accused
that he could not be convicted under the Ohio maiming statute5 6 on two
indictments each charging a penalty growing out of the one act: one
"And upon being restored to reason the accused shall be proceeded against as pro-
vided by law."
Sections 2945.37 and 2945.38 apparently proceed upon the theory that one
whose mental condition is -now so disordered that he is unable to understand the
charge against him, and the possible defenses available, and hence not able properly
to advise with his counsel concermng his defense, should not be tried now, but
should be committed to some proper hospital to remain there until his reason is re-
stored, at which time he should be returned to the court for trial.
r'Akron v. Kline, 165 Ohio St. 322, 135 N.E.2d 265 (1956).
'In re Benjamin, 100 Oho App. 455, 137 N.E.2d 298 (1955), cert. derned, 352
U. S. 933 (1956).
" Oro REv. CoDn § 2901.19.
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charging unlawful assault and putting out an eye and the other charging
maiming by throwing a caustic substance into the victim's face. Release
from imprisonment could not be effected under the writ of habeas corpus
because not even the minimum possible sentence had been served. Ihe
court of appeals suggested that the record be made to conform to the
actual facts, if possible, and if this could not be done that the two indict-
ments should be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings
according to law.
This holding should be compared with the inconsistent holding of
another court of appeals as to this same defendant - that the indictment
which was there determined to have two counts based upon the same act,
could sustain a verdict of guilty on both counts.57 That court was of the
opinion that the same act gave rise to separate and distinct crimes. Which
decision is the correct construction of the maiming statute?5"
Another court of appeals decision had to answer the question whether
the same offenses which had been used as a basis for the sentence of a
defendant under the habitual offender statute upon a prior conviction for
petty larceny, could 'be used as a basis for characterizing the defendant as
an habitual criminal in sentencing after conviction of a new offense.5 9
This meant that the last conviction was added to the prior convictions
previously considered. Counsel for the accused tried to keep the court
from considering the prior offenses through the plea of autrefots contact
before trial and objection at the trial. The plea was properly overruled
because the prior convictions were resorted to for the sole purpose of
determining the extent of the punishment. There was therefore no
question of former jeopardy involved.
4. Rsght to a Bill of Particulars n Munczpal Courts
A defendant in a petty larceny prosecution in the Municipal Court of
Cincinnati demanded a bill of particulars. The general statutes of the
state6" governing procedure in criminal prosecutions in the municipal
courts are silent on the question, and do not afford a right to a bill of
particulars by direct reference to the procedure applicable in the common
pleas court. The only statute governing bills of particulars in criminal
cases is directed to the prosecuting attorney only and therefore does not
apply to municipal court proceedings in absence of an incorporating provi-
"State v. Benjamin, 132 N.E.2d 761 (Ohio App. 1956), appeal dismsssed, 165
Ohio St. 455, 135 N.E.2d 765 (1956), cert. dened, 352 U. S. 933 (1956).
' See discussion of this case under the heading of construction of statutes, supra
note 14.
'Cincinnati v. McKinney, 137 N.E.2d 589 (Ohio App. 1955)
60OHio Ray. CODE § 1901.21 (A).
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sion.61 But is a demand for a bill of particulars necessarily predicated
on a statutory right? If a statutory right does exist, the failure to make a
demand for a bill in the indicated fashion, has been held to be a waiver.62
Article I, section 10 of the Ohio Constitution guarantees the accused a
right to know the nature of the accusation against hm, and this guarantee
seems controlling whether there is any statutory implementaton or not.6s
5. Preludictal Remarks of Counsel
While a prosecuting attorney has a duty to conduct the prosecution
with vigor and alertness, he also has a duty to observe rules of good
practice and propriety in argument. He has considerable latitude in
making deductions and drawing inferences which are based on credible
and substantial evidence. But fundamentally, arguments before the jury
must be confined to the evidence. Therefore it as reversible error for a
prosecutor to use debasing characterizations directed toward the accused
where they are wholly without evidentiary support and actually contrary
to evidence of good character in the record.64
6. Insamty of a Witness
An interesting common pleas court decision refused to withdraw the
testimony of a witness who had previously been adjudicated insane and
had never been legally discharged.6 5 The defendant learned of this fact
on cross-examination, and thereupon moved to withdraw the testimony.
The court in the absence of the jury interrogated the witness and deter-
mined that he had sufficient mental capacity to observe, recollect and
communicate, and possessed a sense of moral responsibility. It then
1Cincianat v. McKinney, 137 N.E.2d 589 (Ohio App. 1955). The court dis-
tingushes such cases as State v. Hutton, 132 Ohio St. 461, 9 N.E.2d 295 (1937),
because of the incorporation of common pleas procedure into the particular munc-
pal court organization.
'
2State v. Hutton, 132 Ohio St. 461, 9 N.E.2d 295 (1937). A court of appeals
decision has held in accord with the leading case that there was no right outside of
common pleas court under the general statute applicable to indictments and in-
formations to demand a bill of particulars. State v. Gutilla, 99 N.E.2d 506 (Ohio
App. 1950).
' In other jurisdictions the right to a bill of particulars seems to be a matter directed
to the sound discretion of the court. See Annot., 5 A.L.R. 2d 444 (1949).
"State v. Morris, 100 Ohio App. 307, 136 N.E.2d 653 (1954). Compare State v.
Rhoads, 137 N.E.2d 628 (Ohio App. 1955), in which the prosecutor made refer-
ences to the fact that defendant had taken a lie detector test, during the voir dire ex-
amination of a prospective juror. The court held that such references to a lie de-
tector test were not prejudicial or misleading when the court had ruled that the
findings produced by the impulses of the lie detector test could not be admitted in
evidence.
' State v. Webb, 131 N.E.2d 273 (Ohio C.P. 1955).
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overruled the motion and instructed the jury that they could consider his
presumed continued disability to the extent that it might affect his worthi-
ness of -belief. The court later overruled a motion for a new trial based
on the same grounds. The trial judge predicated his rulings on an earlier
Supreme Court decision which had held that the competency of an in-
sane person as a witness is a matter which lies in the discretion of the
trial judge, and that a person who is able to correctly state matters which
have come within his perception relative to the issues of the case, and
who appreciates and understands the nature and obligation of an oath,
is competent as a witness despite some unsoundness of mind. 6
7 E 'dence
A decision on appeal from a police court conviction emphasizes the
fact that it is a part of the prosecution's case to establish the corpus
delicti of the alleged offense in every criminal proceeding. The offense
of driving an automobile while under the influence of alcohol cannot be
established solely on the evidence of a police officer who did not see the
alleged driving, was not at the scene of the alleged offense and could only
testify to what the accused told him. 67 Here, as in the other crimes, the
offense cannot be established by extra-judicial confession alone.
A number of cases dealt with the problem of a sufficiency of evi-
dence to establish the prosecution's case. For example, evidence that the
defendant may have been the bottler of certain milk was not sufficient
to establish the element of unlawful sale of milk of a low butter fat
content.68 Evidence of other criminal acts to show intent may, under
the Ohio Code, 9 'be introduced to show the intent with which the act in
the principal case was done, but these offenses must 'be proven by sub-
stantial evidence.70  In a prosecution for violation of an order of a
municipal agency, a matter arose relating to proof of the order and the
prosecution resorted to oral testimony. This was held to be a violation
of the best evidence rule, in the absence of a satisfactory excuse.71 The
courts do take judicial notice of municipal ordinances, but not of rules,
regulations or orders of an administrative agency of the municipality.
' State v. Wildman, 145 Ohio St. 379, 61 N.E.2d 790 (1945). Also the trial judge
took comfort in the fact that there was other substantial competent evidence in the
record.
'Columbus v. Glover, 138 N.E.2d 32 (Ohio C.P. 1955), appeal from conviction
in the police court.
' State v. Belle Vernon Milk Co., 99 Ohio App. 289, 132 N.E.2d 764 (1954).
C OHio REv. CoDE § 2945.59.
"'State v. Roberts, 131 N.E.2d 665 (Ohio App. 1955)
'Toledo v. Tucker, Jr., 99 Ohio App. 346, 133 N.E.2d 411 (1954).
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8. Instructions
Defense counsel in a first-degree manslaughter prosecution requested
16 special charges, and error was assigned because the trial judge did not
give the substance of some of these charges. In its general charge the
court fully covered all the facts which could be considered by the jury
and included the substance of many of the 16 special requests, and no
other omissions were brought to the attention of the court after the giving
of the general charge. There was no error.72
Two court of appeals decisions dealt with the problem of the charge
of the court on lesser included offenses. There is no duty to charge on
manslaughter in a first-degree murder prosecution where there is no
evidence of manslaughter. A court may not charge upon, and a defend-
ant may not be found guilty of a lesser offense, unless the evidence tends
to support each of the necessary elements of the lesser offense.7 3 Fur-
thermore, a failure to charge adequately on a lesser included offense is
not prejudicial where the general charge states the law applicable to the
specific crime charged.74
Under the Ohio Code75 the court m charging the jury must state to
it all matters of law necessary for the information of the jury in giving
its verdict, but the charge must be confined to matters of law. The court
may not give undue prominence to a portion of the evidence or go be-
yond the evidence and inject facts into the case not shown by the evi-
dence. It was error, therefore, for a court, in instructing the jury on the
use of an alcometer, -to read the blood standards adopted by the National
Safety Council where the evidence did not disclose these facts and figures
so referred to.76
A request to charge the jury comes too late where it is made after
the jury has retired to consider its verdict and then on its own motion
returned to the box for further information.77
During the course of its deliberations a jury requested information
about the testimony of a witness. At the suggestion of one of the defense
counsel, the court read the part of a witness' testimony which answered
the question. The court of appeals sustained this action of the trial
judge.78  Since there is no statutory requirement that testimony be read
" State v. Allen, 133 N.E.2d 167 (Ohio App. 1956).
" State v. Alexander, 130 N.E. 2d 378 (Ohio App. 1954).
"'State v. Cooper, 137 N.E.2d 705 (Ohio App. 1955).
5Omo REv. CODE § 2945.11.
"'State v. Minnix, 101 Ohio App. 33, 137 N.E.2d 572 (1956).
'State v. Cross, 137 N.E.2d 690 (Obio App. 1956)
" State v. Jessop, 131 N.E.2d 689 (Ohio App. 1952).
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to the jury or that the trial judge state his recollections of the testimony,
the method of handling such requests is one of discretion resting with the
-trial court. It was not abused in this case.
9. Verdict
The defendant was charged with auto theft and operating a motor
vehicle without the owner's consent, in an indictment containing two
counts. There was a general finding of guilty on each count. The
record, however, did not support the charge of operation without the
owner's consent. The court of appeals reversed the judgment as to the
count for driving without permission, but affirmed it on the count of auto
stealing, remanding the case to the trial court with instructions to re-
sentence the defendant. 79
Another case presented an example of an inconsistent verdict. The
sole issue was whether a security sold came within the Ohio Blue Sky Law.
The jury found the defendant-owner of the security not guilty and then
found guilty the person who was charged as an aider and abettor. Such
a finding is inconsistent and must be set aside.80
In another interesting case, the court actually accepted and considered
the affidavit of a jury which was ostensibly impeaching in nature.81
The juror in question had asked questions about the affect of the jury
not reaching a verdict and also about the time required for deliberations.
It appeared from her affidavit and from the record that the trial judge
-took unusual precautions to inform the jury of its duties and also that a
failure to reach an agreement within a reasonable time would result in
a discharge. The juror could not have been misled and no error oc-
curred.
10. Sentence
Cases are continually coming before the appellate courts in which the
trial court has sentenced a person to a specific period of imprisonment
in the penitentiary. One defendant pleaded guilty to a violation of the
Ohio Narcotics Law,12 and was sentenced to two years in the penitentiary.
-The statute at the time carried no minimum sentence and a maximum of
'State v. Givens, 133 N.E.2d 625 (Ohio App. 1953).
'State v. Hirsch, 131 N.E.2d 419 (Ohio App. 1956). The court distinguishes
cases dealing with inconsistent findings on separate trials of codefendants and also
in joint trials where issues of identity or participation in a criminal act are presented
in the same trial.
'
1State v. Andlauer, 131 N.E.2d 672 (Ohio App. 1955) The use the court made
of the affidavit was actually to sustain rather than impeach the verdict.
SOHio REv. CODE §§ 3719.02, and 3719.99. Section 3719.99 was subsequentlv
amended to provide a minimum sentence of two years.
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5 years. The court -held that the sentence was to be considered as general
even though the lack of a minimum sentence might make the accused
eligible for parole immediately upon sentence."3
In another case the sentence was for not less than one year, and upon
the expiration of the year, the accused sought release on a writ of habeas
corpus.84 Relief was denied on the ground that the sentence was not
void since it was to the penitentiary which made the general statute on
sentencing applicable and which turned the specific sentence into a
general sentence. This sentence was under a statute which permitted the
trial judge to determine whether the pumshment should be for a felony
or a misdemeanor.
Another writ of habeas corpus case raised an issue as to whether a
person who had been committed under -two sentences was entitled to his
release. One of the sentences was void but the other was valid, and
the valid sentence had not yet been served completely. Release was
denied.85
Ohio Revised Code section 2947.25, the Ascherman Act, authorizes a
trial court in a criminal case after conviction and before sentence to
refer the persons convicted for psychiatric examination. Under a find-
ing of mental illness, mental deficiency or being a psychopathic offender,
the court imposes the appropriate sentence for the specific offense and,
in addition, orders an indefimte commitment to the department of mental
hygiene and correction, during which time the sentence is suspended. If
an accused is convicted of one of the specified sex offenses or has shown
abnormal sexual tendencies, the journal of a court proceeding under sec-
tion 2947.25 must show every step in the process, and when it is silent
on any one of the nine requirements, it is deemed reversible error, when
raised by appeal. 86 Such a sentence, even though the procedure required
by the statute is not followed precisely, is good against a collateral at-
tack, and release cannot be obtained through a writ of habeas corpus.87
eState v. Preston, 100 Ohio App. 536, 137 N.E.2d 446 (1955). OHio Rnv. CODE
5145.01 was held applicable to a specific sentence under section 3719.99, even
though the latter section was enacted subsequent to the former, and the sentence
should automatically be treated as imprisonment for an indeterminate period.
" Smith v. Alvis, 134 N.E.2d 868 (Ohio App. 1953).
'In re Oponowicz, 100 Ohio App. 531, 135 N.E.2d 778 (1955).
'State v. Verzi, 102 Ohio App. 1, 134 N.E.2d 843 (1956) The record in this
case was silent except for the imposition and suspension of the sentence. The other
seven requirements were not mentioned in the record.
'McConnaughy v. Alvis, 100 Ohio App. 245, 136 N.E.2d 127 (1955), aff'd, 165
Ohio St. 102, 133 N.E.2d 133 (1955). See reference to the Supreme Court opinion
at notes 101, 102 snfra.
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State v. Trunzo8 s applies the normal rule that a person found guilty
of several separate crimes under different counts of an indictment may be
sentenced on each of the counts, and the question of whether these sen-
tences shall run concurrently or consecutively is a matter within the sound
discretion of the trial court.
11. Parole
Prisoners are continually using the writ of habeas corpus in an effort
to obtain a release when they have served their minimum sentences and
are eligible to be considered for parole.8 9 The courts continue to empha-
size that the rights of a parolee are based solely on the discretion of the
commission, which can grant or refuse a parole for any or no reason.
There is no right to parole on the expiration of a minimum sentence.
Therefore a petitioner who has neither been paroled nor served his
maximum sentence is not entitled to release from imprisonment.90
A person who is declared a parole violator is not entitled to credit
for tune served from the day he is declared a parole violator to the time
of his arrest for being a violator. The time then begins to run again
from the tune of arrest or return to imprisonment. If upon his arrest
he is allowed to remain at liberty, this fact does not interrupt the running
of the time of sentence. In such a case the tune continues to run until
the sentence has expired or he has been again declared a parole violator
before its expiration.91
Criminal Appeals
Criminal appeals lie from inferior courts to the common pleas courts
in certain instances. The scope of such appeal from a conviction of
assault and battery in a justice of the peace court arose in State v.
Mason.92 This case involved a trial in which a jury had been waived in
writing. The lower court had final jurisdiction in such a case, and the
appeal to the common pleas court was limited to questions of law. There
'State v. Trunzo, 137 N.E.2d 511 (Ohio App. 1956) The judge directed that
the sentences run consecutively, and the court of appeals held that this was not error.
'The provisions of OHio REv. CODE §§ 2965.17, 2965.31, and 5145.03-5145.05,
must be considered together. Ex parte Tischler, 127 Ohio St. 404, 188 N.E. 730
(1933), held there was no right to a parole upon expiration of the minimum term
of imprisonment.
' State ex rel. Mason v. Alvis, 135 N.E.2d 90 (Ohio C.P. 1954)
'State ex rel. Nevins v. Eckle, 137 N.E.2d 509 (Ohio App. 1955). In this case
there was an arrest in Georgia and a release there without a return to Ohio. About
three years later the petitioner was declared a parole violator and returned to prison
after that. The court held that the time between the Georgia arrest and the next
parole violation declaration should be counted, and having served his maximum
sentence, he was released.
'State v. Mason, 133 N.E.2d 435 (Ohio App. 1954).
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was no bill of exceptions. The review was therefore limited to deter-
mining whether there was error in the record. There is no trial de novo
in the common pleas court on an appeal from a final judgment of the
trial court.
On an appeal on questions of 'law and face' from a municipal court
to the common pleas court from a conviction in the former court, it is
proper for the common pleas court to consider it as an appeal on ques-
tions of law only, and it may reverse the conviction upon a determination
that the evidence did not achieve the high degree of probative force and
certainty which the law demands to support a conviction.93
Ohio Revised Code section 2953.05 authorizes an appeal as a matter
of right withih thirty days after sentence and judgment. This contem-
plates a formal judgment, and an appeal does not lie from a ruling of the
trial court in sustaining a demurrer to a plea in abatement to the in-
formation.
94
After the thirty day period has expired, the appeal may be filed only
by leave of the court or two of its judges.95 An appellant who had pleaded
guilty to a charge of fraudulent delivery of checks was denied leave to
appeal upon his charge that the evidence was not sufficient to support
a conviction. Such a ground may not be urged upon a plea of guilty.96
A recurrent question submitted on appeals -to the court of appeals is
whether the verdict of guilty is against the weight of the evidence. This
involves more than a determination as to whether there is some evidence
which tends to support the verdict. It is the duty of the court of appeals
to determine the weight of the evidence.97  This involves passing judg-
ment upon whether the record contains evidence, direct and circumstan-
tial, from which the jury, if it believed such evidence, could conclude
that the accused was guilty 'beyond a reasonable doubt.
The convicted accused who is successful in obtaining a new trial
must stand trial again upon the original indictment or information as
though there had been no previous trial. Thus, an accused who had
obtained a new trial after a conviction of second-degree murder under
an indictment charging murder in the first-degree, could 'be retried under
the original indictment and found guilty again of murder in the second
degree. 8 While there has been some question about the affect of the
granting of a new -trial under similar circumstances in a number of other
'Toledo v. Lowenberg, 99 Ohio App. 165, 131 N.E.2d 682 (1955)
"State v. Himlerick, 100 Ohio App. 476, 137 N.E.2d 297 (1954).
05OHio REv. CODE § 2953.05.
State v. Hertz, 135 N.E.2d 781 (Ohio App. 1954)
'State v. Arrindella, 137 N.E.2d 136 (Ohio App. 1956).
1 State v. Robinson, 100 Otuo App. 466, 137 N.E.2d 141 (1956).
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